On September 27, 2025, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) announced the extension of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) for another six months in three key Districts of Assam — Tinsukia, Charaideo and Sivasagar — effective from October 1. Acting on a recommendation from the Assam Government, which cited the need for continued vigilance in these sensitive areas, the Centre concurred that the districts should remain classified as “Disturbed Areas” under the Act.
A day earlier, on September 26, 2025, the UMHA had similarly extended AFSPA across almost the entire state of Manipur for six months, sparing only the jurisdictions of 13 of a total of 100 Police Stations in the state. The official notification stated,
Whereas the Central Government, after review of the law-and-order situation in the State of Manipur, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (28 of 1958), declares the entire State of Manipur, excluding the areas falling under the jurisdiction of the following 13 (thirteen) Police Stations of five districts, as a ‘disturbed area’ for a period of six months with effect from 01.10.2025, unless withdrawn earlier.
The excluded Police station areas were Imphal, Lamphel, City, Singjamei, Patsoi, Wangoi, Porompat, Heingang, Irilbung, Thoubal, Bishnupur, Nambol and Kakching — largely covering the Imphal Valley and a few adjoining areas.
On the same day, September 26, 2025, the UMHA also extended AFSPA in Nagaland. The fresh notification covers nine districts — Dimapur, Niuland, Chumoukedima, Mon, Kiphire, Noklak, Phek, Peren and Meluri — and additionally includes 21 Police Station jurisdictions in another five districts: Kohima, Mokokchung, Longleng, Wokha and Zunheboto. This extension underscores the continuing security concerns in areas affected by residual insurgent activity and cross-border movement.
Simultaneously, AFSPA was renewed in Arunachal Pradesh for six months, covering the frontier Districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding, along with the areas under the Namsai, Mahadevpur and Chowkham Police Stations in Namsai District bordering Assam. This move reflects the Centre’s assessment of the region’s strategic sensitivity and the need for heightened vigilance in these vulnerable border zones.
AFSPA gives security forces (SFs) in areas declared “disturbed” under Section 3, special powers of search, arrest, cordon and, where necessary, the use of force, while shielding personnel from prosecution without central sanction. Originally designed to counter insurgency and violent unrest in the Northeast, it later applied to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Over decades it has become both a key counterinsurgency tool and a focus of human rights criticism. In recent years the Centre has progressively rolled back AFSPA as insurgent activity declined, yet pockets of insurgency, extortion, recruitment and cross-border movement persist. The September 2025 extensions demonstrate that, despite broad improvements, governments remain wary of relapse. The fact that multiple states requested the extensions signals these are not solely central impositions but part of a state–centre security calibration.
Northeast India’s security is shaped by a mosaic of ethnic identities, insurgent movements, cross-border sanctuaries and contested governance. Invoking extraordinary powers such as AFSPA both reflects and shapes this milieu. AFSPA is at once a military measure, a political signal and a legal scaffold for exceptional operations. Each state’s situation illustrates how the Act now functions as a calibrated instrument rather than a blunt tool.
Manipur’s extension occurs against a particularly volatile background. Since May 2023, the state has been convulsed by ethnic violence between the Meitei, dominant in the Imphal Valley, and the Kuki–Zo tribes in the Hills. Over 250 people have been killed, tens of thousands displaced and thousands of incidents of arson recorded. The proximate trigger was a High Court recommendation on extending affirmative action benefits to the Meitei community, sparking polarisation. Vigilante militias and self-defence groups proliferated, undermining state authority. President’s Rule was imposed in February 2025 to stabilise administration.
In such a context AFSPA is especially controversial. Proponents argue it deters militant escalation and reassures vulnerable communities; critics contend it risks exacerbating alienation, aggravating abuses and inflaming grievances. In Manipur, AFSPA is deployed in a context of horizontal ethnic conflict rather than classic insurgency, making its legitimacy and effectiveness hinge on social cohesion, rule-of-law optics and prospects for reconciliation, not just tactical gains.
Assam presents a contrasting trajectory. AFSPA has receded there over time, with many districts once under its ambit declassified from the “disturbed” category, owing to improved law and order. The September 2025 extension to just three districts – Tinsukia, Charaideo and Sivasagar – highlights how selective and localised the Act has become. These areas still report sporadic incidents involving suspected United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) cadres and movement of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) operatives linked to extortion, recruitment or transit operations. This suggests AFSPA now functions as a residual containment tool, whereas policing and intelligence elsewhere suffice. Yet the continued deployment also signals enduring vulnerabilities in border districts and deters insurgent reactivation. Assam shows how AFSPA can be employed in a targeted, scaled-down mode, rather than statewide and general usage.
Nagaland remains an entrenched conflict theatre, though violence has declined amid ongoing peace negotiations. The 2025 extension covers nine districts – Dimapur, Niuland, Chumoukedima, Mon, Kiphire, Noklak, Phek, Peren and Meluri – and parts of five others. Here AFSPA’s legitimacy is less contested than in Manipur, since the conflict remains framed as insurgency rather than inter-ethnic war. The Act is justified by the continued presence of multiple Naga rebel factions, extortion networks and cross-state sanctuaries, particularly near the Myanmar border. The extension indicates that, despite peace parleys, the security apparatus anticipates lingering destabilisation and sees AFSPA as a backstop to prevent regression and support intelligence-led operations. Yet misuse can undercut the fragile legitimacy of both state and central roles in conflict resolution.
Arunachal Pradesh has porous borders with Myanmar and Assam, and intermingling tribal zones. The 2025 extension confines AFSPA to Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts, and parts of Namsai. These are frontier districts most exposed to insurgent transit, recruitment and extortion. AFSPA’s role here is defensive and preventive, managing external spillover risks rather than internal insurgency. It preserves coercive leverage in border areas, where intelligence gaps, terrain and cross-border movement complicate policing. Arunachal thus illustrates how AFSPA can serve as a frontier buffer even as insurgency recedes elsewhere.
Across the four states the 2025 AFSPA extensions reveal both continuity and adaptation. Assam and Arunachal retain AFSPA only in critical zones; Nagaland applies it more widely but still with geographic focus; Manipur remains nearly statewide. In Manipur especially, deploying AFSPA in the context of an ethnic conflict places novel burdens on its legitimacy and oversight. Across all states its expansive powers pose risks of overreach – excessive force, arbitrary arrests and civilian backlash. In tribal and conflict-sensitive societies these risks can exacerbate alienation. Legitimacy depends on accountability mechanisms and transparent oversight, which have been historically weak. It is vital that AFSPA not supplant civilian policing and intelligence-led counterinsurgency. The objective should be to use AFSPA sparingly, as a temporary stabiliser, while building civilian capacities. Clear criteria and benchmarks for withdrawal – such as reduced incidents of militancy or improved policing metrics – are essential to avoid perpetual special powers. Transparent communication and community consultation can prevent AFSPA being seen as a tool of domination.
The extensions also reflect evolving strategic dynamics. Myanmar’s conflict and porous border zones increase the risk of insurgent spillovers, making buffer zones under AFSPA essential to pre-empt infiltration. There have been reports of Myanmar-based insurgent groups augmenting Kuki militia capabilities in Manipur.
While much of the Northeast has seen declining insurgency indices, pockets of threat persist. The selective extension of AFSPA reveals that national security agencies continue to adopt a cautious posture. The states of India’s Northeast are not hermetically sealed; ethnic groups, insurgent movements and criminal networks cross boundaries. AFSPA usage in one state is often linked to developments in another, demanding coordination of intelligence, policing and military operations. The use of coercive power in tribal and frontier regions remains a test of state legitimacy. Misuse can fuel narratives of discrimination or colonisation; proper employment can bolster trust and security. Persistent extensions of AFSPA may also deter investment, development and integration in tribal regions, which makes complementary socio-economic measures vital – development, political inclusion, local self-governance and police modernisation.
The six-month AFSPA extensions in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh as of late 2025 underscore both the progress and fragility of Northeast India’s security milieu. Counterinsurgency successes allow for narrower deployment in Assam and Arunachal, while the persistence of ethnic conflagration in Manipur and residual insurgency in Nagaland caution against blanket deactivation. Each state presents distinct justifications and risks. Manipur’s ethnic conflict demands extraordinary care, oversight and plans for de-escalation. Assam’s selective retention reflects its maturation into a surgical instrument. Nagaland’s enduring conflict setting calls for steady but legitimate use. Arunachal’s border vulnerabilities situate AFSPA as a frontier buffer. For the Northeast to move from crisis management to stable normalcy, continuous review, robust accountability, strengthened civilian institutions and clear exit benchmarks are imperative. AFSPA should not become a permanent crutch but a transitional stabiliser, gradually ceding space to strengthened policing, community trust and political reconciliation.
Authored by Dr. Afsara Shaheen, Research Associate at the Institute for Conflict Management.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, Dr. Afsara Shaheen, Research Associate at the Institute for Conflict Management. They do not necessarily represent or reflect the views of the publication. The publication does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of the information provided, and accepts no liability for any loss or damage arising from reliance on the content. Any legal claims or disputes relating to the content of this article shall be directed solely to the author and not to the publication.
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