On September 3, 2025, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), the Manipur Government, and representatives of two umbrella groupings of Kuki-Zo insurgent organisations – the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF) – signed a renewed Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement. KNO ‘spokesperson’ Seilen Haokip confirmed that the agreement was signed following a meeting with UMHA representatives.
The tripartite agreement, concluded in New Delhi and effective for one year from the date of signing, comes with renegotiated “ground rules” that the Centre described as aimed at making monitoring more transparent and enforcement more credible. The pact, reiterates Manipur’s territorial integrity, mandates relocation of designated camps, verification of cadres, deportation of foreign nationals, and stricter monitoring by a Joint Group. Insurgent groups agreed to shift seven camps away from conflict zones and deposit weapons with CRPF/BSF camps.
The timing of the pact is notable: it precedes a likely visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Manipur scheduled on September 13, and coincides with the decision to reopen National Highway (NH)-2 (Imphal–Dimapur) by the Kuki-Zo Council, a lifeline whose disruptions deepened humanitarian and economic distress since 2023. Together, the fresh SoO and reopening of NH-2 are intended to reduce immediate friction, restore essential mobility, and create space for political dialogue.
The SoO agreement emerged from a turbulent history of ethnic insurgency in Manipur. Since the late 1980s, multiple Kuki insurgent groups had mobilised in response to political marginalisation, inter-ethnic violence, and the lack of constitutional recognition for Kuki-Zo aspirations. The early 1990s were marked by devastating Kuki–Naga clashes, which killed over a thousand people and displaced tens of thousands. These clashes left enduring scars, deepening insecurity and driving many young Kukis into armed militancy. By the 2000s, the cumulative effect of violence, extortion, and counterinsurgency operations had destabilised Hill Districts such as Churachandpur, Kangpokpi, and Chandel.
Recognising that a purely military solution was untenable, the Government of India and the Manipur Government sought a political-security arrangement. On August 22, 2008, the first tripartite SoO agreement was signed between the Government of India, Manipur government and the umbrella Kuki organisations—KNO and UPF. Although not a peace settlement, the SoO represented a pragmatic truce that reduced direct confrontations and created room for dialogue. Over the years, the SoO became a critical tool in conflict management, though it was frequently tested by allegations of violations, shifting political priorities, and inter-community tensions.
The trajectory of the SoO can be mapped through pivotal milestones. After its inception in August 2008, the agreement was renewed annually, with oversight provided by the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG). Through the 2010s, it maintained relative calm in Kuki-majority districts, despite accusations of groups engaging in extortion or recruitment under its cover. By 2023, however, ethnic violence between Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities destabilised the arrangement, as reports surfaced of SoO signatories being drawn into the conflict. On February 29, 2024, the Manipur government unilaterally withdrew from the SoO, accusing the groups of “serious ground rules violations.” This withdrawal sharply escalated insecurity in the hills, further complicating the humanitarian crisis. After months of deadlock, the Centre intervened and renegotiated terms, culminating in the present renewed SoO, with stricter enforcement mechanisms. This timeline underscores both the fragility and resilience of the SoO as an instrument of conflict management.
The SoO rests on a carefully structured framework. Over time, 25 out of the 30 Kuki-Zo insurgent groups aligned under the KNO and UPF joined the arrangement, moving their cadres into 14 designated camps across Manipur’s hill districts. The agreement is reviewed and extended annually, contingent on compliance. Its central elements include a ceasefire provision – armed cadres suspend hostilities while the state halts military operations; a designated camp system, wherein militants receive a monthly stipend of INR 6,000 each as part of a rehabilitation package; and disarmament measures, mandating that weapons be stored in camp armouries under a double-lock system, with one key held by the group and the other by security forces (SFs).
To ensure accountability, a JMG was set up, consisting of Manipur’s Home Department, the Army, paramilitary forces, and the Union Home Ministry (UHM). Meeting monthly, the JMG assesses compliance, investigates violations, and makes recommendations on extensions. Exclusion clauses prohibit groups from recruiting new cadres, raising parallel outfits, or engaging in symbolic militarisation such as flag-hoisting, memorials, or armed parades. In return, the SoO offers space for political dialogue between insurgent leaders and government representatives, making it both a security and political mechanism.
The SoO has had several layers of significance in Manipur’s security and political context. First, it contained armed violence by reducing open confrontations between Kuki-Zo groups and Indian SFs. Second, it provided a platform for political dialogue, enabling grievances to be articulated without violence. Third, it maintained balance in the insurgency landscape, where Naga groups already enjoyed a ceasefire arrangement with the Centre; extending a similar mechanism to Kukis prevented asymmetry that could fuel insecurity. Fourth, it enabled governance and development initiatives in previously inaccessible hill regions. Fifth, its very existence carried symbolic weight—showing that despite differences, dialogue was possible. Finally, in the wake of the 2023 ethnic conflict, the SoO acquired new relevance, as its suspension in 2024 exacerbated violence and humanitarian distress, underscoring its role as a stabilising instrument.
The renewed SoO of September 2025 introduces stricter monitoring and enforcement measures. The Centre reportedly insisted on clearer accountability mechanisms within the JMG, more stringent restrictions on the movement of cadres, and stricter separation of designated camps from civilian settlements and key highways. The emphasis on enforcement reflects past concerns that some insurgent groups exploited the SoO to extort, recruit, or arm themselves. The political timing also matters: Prime Minister Modi’s impending visit to Manipur requires visible steps towards reconciliation, while the reopening of NH-2, long blocked by protests and insecurity, signals attempts to restore economic lifelines. The renewal is therefore both a tactical intervention in security management and a strategic move to revive political processes.
Despite its significance, the SoO faces persistent challenges. Alleged violations of ground rules – particularly extortion, recruitment, or misuse of designated camps – have repeatedly strained trust in the past. The unilateral withdrawal by the Manipur Government in 2024 illustrates the fragility of the state’s confidence in the arrangement. Furthermore, the 2023–24 ethnic conflict complicated enforcement, as SFs accused some SoO-linked groups of partisanship. Another structural challenge is the double authority problem: while the Centre favours continuity of the SoO, the State Government often adopts a more sceptical stance, producing friction in implementation. The porous Indo-Myanmar border also complicates monitoring, as transnational movement of cadres and weapons is difficult to regulate, raising doubts about compliance.
Beyond its security aspects, the SoO has had humanitarian and political consequences. For the local Kuki-majority hill districts, it provided relative respite from counterinsurgency operations, allowing limited normalcy and access to development schemes. Cadres in designated camps benefited from stipends and a degree of rehabilitation support. Politically, the SoO recognised the KNO and UPF as legitimate interlocutors, giving them space to articulate long-standing demands. The suspension of the SoO in 2024 deepened the humanitarian crisis, worsening displacement and insecurity. Its renewal in 2025, therefore, is not merely a tactical reset but also a humanitarian necessity to stabilise lives disrupted by violence.
The SoO’s renewal, however, is not a guarantee of peace. Risks persist, of groups exploiting the pact, of uneven enforcement between the Centre and state agencies, and of renewed ethnic confrontation undermining compliance. Without substantive political dialogue addressing deeper grievances – whether related to Kuki-Zo autonomy, resource distribution, or inter-community security – the SoO risks becoming a holding mechanism rather than a path to resolution. Nevertheless, its continuation offers breathing space. For the Centre, it buys time to push development and integration agendas. For Manipur, it represents a fragile but necessary tool to prevent escalation. For insurgent groups, it offers survival and political legitimacy. The road ahead will depend on whether stakeholders treat the SoO as a stepping-stone to reconciliation or as a temporary truce with no lasting solution.
The renewed SoO agreement of September 2025 must be seen in both immediate and long-term contexts. Immediately, it reduces tensions, restores dialogue, and enables steps like reopening NH-2 to relieve humanitarian distress. In the long term, its success will depend on whether it can evolve from a conflict-management mechanism into a peacebuilding instrument. The history of the SoO since 2008 shows both its utility and fragility—capable of preventing escalation, yet vulnerable to mistrust and political divergence. In a state scarred by violence, mistrust, and ethnic division, the SoO is not a panacea but remains an indispensable tool. Its renewal in 2025, with stricter terms and closer monitoring, offers Manipur another chance at stability. Whether that chance is seized depends on the political will of all stakeholders and the resilience of dialogue over violence.
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